A standard result in the literature on monetary policy rules is that of certainty equivalence: given the expected values of all the state variables of the economy, policy should be set in a way that is independent of all higher moments of those variables. Some exceptions to this rule have been pointed out by Smets 1998, who restricts policy to respond to only a limited subset of state variables, and by Orphanides 1998, who restricts policy to respond to estimates of the state variables that are biased. In contrast, this paper studies unrestricted, fully optimal policy rules with optimal estimation of state variables. The rules in this framework exhibit certainty equivalence with respect to estimates of an unobserved, possibly complicated, state of the economy X, but are not certainty-equivalent when 1 a signal-extraction problem is involved in the estimation of X, and 2 the optimal rule is expressed as a reduced form that combines policymakers' estimation and policy-setting stages. In general, I show that it is optimal for policymakers to attenuate their reaction coe cient o n a v ariable about which uncertainty has increased, while responding more aggressively to all other variables, about which uncertainty hasn't changed.
Introduction
Increased uncertainty about the current growth rate of productivity, potential output, and the natural rate of unemployment has led to questions about how monetary policy should be altered in the face of this uncertainty. The question is extremely important from a practical point of view What should the Federal Reserve do today?, as well as being of particular theoretical interest What are the various types of uncertainty faced by policymakers, and what e ects should each of these have on optimal policy?
A natural place to begin the investigation of these di cult questions is within the framework of monetary policy rules, such as those put forward by Taylor 1993 . The advantage of these rules is that they are explicit, well-de ned, and simple functions of variables within a completely speci ed economic model. Di erent types of uncertainty within the model can then be speci ed and their e ects studied. The fact that Taylor-type rules have matched the historical behavior of the Federal Reserve for the past 15 20 years also lends support to their use as an analytical laboratory for the investigation of these issues.
A t ypical setup involves an economy that is linear in all of its variables, and policymakers who minimize an expected discounted sum of squared deviations of goal variables from their respective targets. The following backward-looking model serves as an illustrative example: 1 y t , y = 'y t,1 , y , r t , r + " t 1a t = t,1 + y t , y + t 1b where y t , t , and r t refer to output, in ation, and the real interest rate in period t, y and r denote the levels of potential output and the natural" rate of interest consistent with long-run equilibrium, respectively, and r t is set by policymakers at the beginning of period t based on information available through the end of period t , 1. A typical speci cation of policymakers' preferences is: min 1 , E t 1 X s=t s,t s , 2 + y s , y 2 2 a simple discounted sum of expected squared deviations of output from potential and in ation from its target, , with weight placed on the output gap. The case = 0 corresponds to pure in ation targeting by policymakers, but does not necessarily prevent current or past values of the output gap from entering policymakers' optimal reaction function, since these variables may help forecast future values of in ation. Note that it is assumed in the model for simplicity that policymakers have control over the short-term real interest rate, r t . This is a simple, discrete-time dynamic programming problem with quadratic objective and linear constraints, the solution of which is well known Sargent 1987: r t , r = a y t,1 , y + b t,1 , A major implication of this nding is that uncertainty about the level of potential output, y , should have no e ect on the monetary policy rule. If at time t we have y =ŷ + , where is a mean-zero stochastic disturbance andŷ E t y , then the form of equations 1a and 1b is essentially unchanged, with y replaced byŷ , " t replaced by" t " t , 1 , ', and t replaced by t t , . Then, as before, the variances of" and, and hence the variance of , have no e ect on the optimal policy rule|one simply replaces y withŷ in equation 3 and acts as if this estimateŷ were known with certainty. This result is emphasized by Estrella and Mishkin 1998 , and is standard in the literature on monetary policy rules.
To be sure, not all types of uncertainty are sterile when it comes to their e ects on optimal policy. For example, if policymakers are unsure about the e ects of their control variable r t on the economy, so that is stochastic, the optimal choice of r t will depend on the degree of uncertainty underlying the parameter Brainard 1967 , Sack 1998 . Here, the uncertainty i s multiplicative with respect to the control variable, rather than being simply additive. 2 In this paper, however, I abstract away from multiplicative uncertainty f o r a n umber of reasons. First, it is well known that certainty equivalence does not hold in the presence of multiplicative uncertainty. Second, the e ects of multiplicative uncertainty on policymakers' optimal response function 3 are ambiguous in sign when more than one coe cient is stochastic, and found by several authors to be quantitatively small in simulations Estrella and Mishkin 1998, Rudebusch 1999a. 3 Finally, and most importantly, the uncertainty which policymakers appear to bemost concerned with today is primarily additive in nature: Has there been a structural break in the growth rate of productivity, potential output, and the natural rate of unemployment? These are questions about the state variables of the economy themselves, not about the e ects of choice variables on the economic state.
The main point of this paper is that additive uncertainty can have important e ects on optimal policy, even within a linear-quadratic framework. Suppose, for example, that the state of the economy i s X t , an unobserved, possibly large vector. 4 Suppose further that output and in ation are observable functions of this unobserved state of the economy X t .
Policymakers will behave in a certainty-equivalent fashion with respect toX t , the expected value of X t , but will use observations of output and in ation to help infer what the value ofX t is. This inference stage of the problem, because it is one of signal extraction, is sensitive to the amount of uncertainty that is present in the observable variables of the system. In particular, as the noise in the data on the output gap, y t , y , increases relative to the signal about X t , it is optimal to decrease the coe cient on y t , y in the estimation ofX t , and increase the coe cient on in ation in that estimation. Thus, the optimal policy, when expressed as a reduced-form function of output and in ation, rather thanX t , i s not invariant to the degree of additive uncertainty in the former variables. It is important to note that both the rule itself and policymakers' estimateX t are fully optimal in this framework|at every time t, policymakers' interest-rate choice and estimate of state variables are globally optimal, and cannot beimproved upon in any way. This is one of the main respects in which the present paper di ers from previous work in this area.
Previous studies of non-certainty-equivalence with additive uncertainty have followed either Smets 1998 or Orphanides 1998 . Smets 1998 points out that certainty equivalence fails to hold when policymakers are constrained to respond to only a limited subset of the state variables of the system, so that the policy rule is a constrained optimum, rather than a global optimum. This restriction makes sense, in particular, when the size of the state space is large, as in Orphanides et al. 1999 and Drew and Hunt 1999, who work with the Federal Reserve Board's and Reserve Bank of New Zealand's macro models, respectively. 5 Uncertainty about any of the variables in the policymakers' simple rule will then lead the optimal coe cients of the simple rule to change. 6 Orphanides 1998 focuses on the fact that the data, such as the output gap and in ation rate, are observed only imperfectly in real time. By the certainty equivalence principle, policymakers' optimal response in this case is to formulate best estimates of the output gap, E t y t , y t , and in ation, E t t , and act as if these estimates were known with certainty. Orphanides and others Aoki 1999 , Rudebusch 1999a ,b bring about non-certainty-equivalence in this framework by constraining policy to react to the actual real-time data, rather than to the best estimates above. This naturally raises the question as to why the actual real-time data are not real-time best estimates of the true values.
For example, if y t denotes the level of potential output, and y tjt the real-time esti-5 Actually, the RBNZ's macro model has an important nonlinearity in the relationship between in ation and unemployment. This implies that certainty equivalence will fail to hold even when policy is an optimal function of all state variables of the system. The FRB US model, though nonlinear, is well-approximated by its linearization, and in fact it is the linearization that is used in Orphanides et al. 1999 . Thus, certainty equivalence would hold in their paper if policy were allowed to be a function of all of the model's state variables, and the unobserved variables were estimated optimally.
6 Uncertainty about any state variables not in the policymakers' simple rule will have no e ect; this will be obvious from the discussion of the results in Section 2, below. mate of the level of potential output, one would normally expect that:
where t is a mean-zero random variable. In this case, y tjt = E t y t , so the real-time data is the real-time best estimate! The constraint that policymakers react only to the real-time data is then not really a constraint at all, and the certainty equivalence principle will hold.
It Orphanides 1998 . Instead, it is the introduction of a signal extraction problem into the policymakers' inference step that drives the result. The general implications of formulating policymakers' inference problem in this way is the domain of the present paper. In addition, the noncertainty-equivalent policies that are emphasized in Orphanides 1998 and Rudebusch 1999a,b are not fully optimal|they can beimproved upon by making use of additional lags of the data, for example. Thus, it is di cult in those papers to distinguish between the e ects of uncertainty in the inference step of the problem versus the e ects of uncertainty that arise from using a substantially constrained policy response function. In the present paper, all policy rules and all estimation will be fully optimal. Again, this is one of the main points of departure from previous work.
Section two of the paper develops the relationship between signal extraction and noncertainty-equivalence in a simple descriptive model of the economy, under both naive and rational expectations. Section three extends these results to the general linear-quadraticGaussian framework and proves the coe cient attenuation result for the general case. Section four extends the basic model to allow for dynamic evolution of uncertainty, and proves that the results of section two are robust to this extension. Section ve discusses the results and concludes.
The Basic Model
Policymakers have preferences over in ation and output of the form: where denotes policymakers' long-run target for the in ation rate and y denotes the level of potential" output consistent with long-run equilibrium. The case = 0 corresponds to pure in ation targeting, but does not necessarily preclude current or past values of the output gap from entering policymakers' optimal reaction function, since they may help forecast in ation.
For the purposes of this section, the unobserved signal" variable X t will betaken to be a scalar. The interpretation in this case is that the true underlying state of the economy is scalar, or alternatively that X t is an index of in ationary pressures, this index itself being an amalgam of a great many v ariables underlying the economy. In either case, X t is assumed to evolve according to: X t = 'X t,1 , r t , r + " t 6a while the output gap and in ation are observable functions of this unobserved state:
Here r denotes the natural" rate of interest, consistent with long-run equilibrium, and , , and ' are known positive parameters with ' 1. The stochastic disturbances " t , t , and t are independent of each other, over time, of current and prior values of X, y, and , and are normally distributed with constant variances 2 " , 2 , and 2 , respectively. The variable X t and its past values are never observed by policymakers and must be inferred from previous observations of output and in ation. Equations 6b and 6c represent the signal extraction aspect of the problem, with t and t denoting noise disturbances that are orthogonal to the underlying signal X t .
One may assume that y is observed with certainty, or alternatively that it is stochastic and r are presumed to be known with certainty, although in principle these restrictions, too, could be dropped. Letting y =ŷ + , where is a random variable, one can rewrite equation 6b as:
where t t + is orthogonal to X t . 7 From the point of view of policymakers' decision at time t, this is equivalent to simply increasing the variance of t in equation 6b, so the analysis is simpli ed, without loss of generality, by restricting attention to that equation, and studying the e ects of an increase in 2 . 8 Equation 6c also incorporates economic agents' prior expectation of the in ation rate, e t , which is known and xed at the beginning of period t. In principle, this could bea rational expectation e of nitely many lags of observable variables; thus, that assumption will be maintained here.
In addition, for the purposes of this section, it will beassumed that e t is either rational or purely naive e t t,1 , as this keeps the numberof state variables in the model to a minimum. 9 The timing of policymakers' observations and actions is as follows. At the beginning of period t, policymakers update their beliefs about X t,1 based on observations of y t,1 , t,1 , and the earlier choice of r t,1 . Based on these updated beliefs, policymakers then choose a value of r t that minimizes the expected loss function 5. Shocks to the economy " t , t , and t are then realized and the values y t and t observed. Thus, policymakers' information set at time t is: I t f ; ; ; ' ; Policymakers update beliefs about X t,1 via Kalman ltering. Because " t ; t ; t i s multivariate normally distributed, this is the optimal inference procedure minimizing the mean-squared error of the estimate, and is equivalent to Bayesian updating. 10 The optimal solution to policymakers' problem 5, given the structure of the economy 6 and information set 7, is: r t = r + a E t X t , and Var t X t,1 policymakers' time t prior variance on X t,1 , derived recursively from Var 0 X 0 by the Kalman ltering algorithm. In this respect, the linear-quadratic problem with signal extraction continues to display certainty equivalence.
In forming the optimal estimate E t X t,1 , however, policymakers do respond to the amount of uncertainty in the problem. Their prior time t,1, i.e. before values of y t,1 and t,1 are observed distribution on X t,1 ; y t,1 ,y ; t,1 , e t,1 is given by: . Equation 9 is analogous to the simpler formula for signal extraction with one observable variable, E t X t,1 = E t,1 X t,1 + , 2 x = 2 x + 2 y t,1 ,y ,E t,1 y t,1 ,y , with additional terms in the coe cients that take into account the covariance between output and in ation. 12 Grouping terms in 9 yields:
'E t,1 X t,2 , r t,1 , r 12 Given the normality assumption, the formula for the best predictor E t X t,1 is the theoretical regres- where the E t,1 X t,2 term can be cascaded backward and expressed as a function of lagged observations of y, , and r to the point where the original distribution on X 0 is negligible, as it is multiplied by a large power of '.
Note that, even though policymakers' optimal reaction function 8 is certaintyequivalent in terms of the estimate E t X t,1 , when expressed as a function of present and past observable variables y, , and r, certainty equivalence in the reduced form no longer holds. The variances of the additive disturbance terms enter into the coe cients of 10. For example, consider the e ects of an increase in 2 on the coe cients in equation 10. 13 As 2 increases, the quantity increases, but less than proportionately. This implies that the coe cient o n y t,1 ,y in 10 decreases in magnitude, so that policymakers place less weight on the observation of the uncertain output gap in forming their inference about the underlying state of the economy. Thus, we h a ve an example of coe cient attenuation on the noisy or uncertain variable. In addition, the coe cients on each of the other variables in equation 10 increase in absolute value: policymakers place more weight on those variables about which they are relatively more certain. In this sense, policymakers become less proactive and more reactive," responding less forcefully to the current value of the output gap, and more forcefully to past observations of output and in ation, and the current in ation rate, because these variables provide more reliable information about the current state of the economy and future values of policymakers' goal variables, in ation and output. 14 13 As noted above in footnotes 7 and 8, this can be thought of as corresponding to a structural break in y which has been known to occur in the previous period. This causes 2
to rise for the current period but not for previous periods, and hence leaves 2 x una ected. 14 This less proactive" result could be emphasized further by setting up the main model with an additional lag in equation 6c, so that:
These conclusions are not idiosyncratic to an increase in the variance of the additive disturbance t . For example, an increase in 2 , instead of 2 , leads to a decrease in the coe cient on t,1 , e t,1 in equation 10, and an increase in the coe cients on the other variables in that equation. Exactly analogous results lower coe cient on the noisy variable, higher coe cients on the others obtain in response to an increase in 2 x , the policymakers' prior variance on X t,1 . Thus, the result described above is robust, and derives not from any special assumptions surrounding the model, but rather from the general principle that in linear regression, or statistical projection, less weight is given to observations that have higher variance. Obviously, as with linear regression and statistical projection, the covariances between the di erent variables matters for the coe cients in 10. So far, I have abstracted away from this problem by assuming that the disturbances are orthogonal to each other, and to policymakers' prior for the variable X t,1 , but I show below for the general case, with arbitrary covariances, that the basic coe cient attenuation result still holds: an increase in the uncertainty surrounding a given variable causes policymakers to assign less weight to that variable in forming their best estimate of the underlying state of the economy, E t X t,1 . Moreover, the ampli cation of the coe cients on in ation and its lags in 10 is also quite robust, and holds for models more general than that of the present section. For example, section 4 proves this result for the case where increased uncertainty about potential output extends backward any numberof periods, is correlated across time, and is correlated with policymakers' priors about the unobserved state of the economy X t,1 , in a manner which is consistent with policymakers learning about potential output over time.
Finally, the direction that the coe cients in equation 10 move can beambiguous when one increases the variance of more than one variable at a time. For example, increasing 2 and 2
x simultaneously causes the coe cient on the una ected variable t,1 , e t,1 to increase unambiguously, but the e ect on the other two coe cients is not clear. 15 where y ŷ + and t t , , the non-certainty-equivalence results described above are completely eliminated. In both 6b y and 6b z , the policymaker's optimal estimate of the underlying state of the economy, E t X t,1 , is simply y t,1 , y in the rst case, and y t,1 ,ŷ in the second. This estimate is certainty-equivalent, and plugged into the certainty-equivalent structural response in 8, the reduced-form policy response retains the certainty-equivalence property. This implies that it is not noisy data per se that justi es caution on the part of policymakers in Orphanides 1998 and Rudebusch 1999a . If the real-time data are unbiased forecasts of the true values, analogous to 6b y or 6b z , then certainty equivalence holds, and the amount of uncertainty surrounding these real-time estimates is completely irrelevant. Certainty equivalence only fails to hold in their framework if the real-time data are realizations of true values plus noise and thus are biased forecasts of the true values, so that estimation of the true values involves a signal extraction problem as in 6b.
This naturally raises the question as to whether the real-time data are better modeled as rational forecasts or as noise-contaminated realizations. Orphanides 1998 Orphanides , 1999 presents gures demonstrating that the output gap, in particular, has been badly mismeasured by policymakers in real time. However, both the size of these errors and their serial correlation were not evident until several years after the fact, so it is not clear that these real-time estimates of the output gap were not rational forecasts at the time. To take the position that policymakers were deliberately irrational in their real-time estimates seems unwarranted without a more rigorous analysis of policymakers' forecasts to support this point of view.
Rigorous analysis of the performance of real-time data and o cial forecasts has been undertaken by a n umber of authors, albeit with data that is more readily observable than the output gap, such as real GDP and in ation. Mankiw and Shapiro 1986 analyze whether the real-time real GNP data produced by the BEA is better modeled as a rational forecast or as a realization with noise of the true" i.e., nal value. They nd that the real-time data appear to beunbiased and e cient rational forecasts. McNees 1995 looks at the o cial forecasts of real GNP GDP and in ation put out by the CBO and Federal Reserve System as presented in Humphrey-Hawkins" reports and nds that they perform at least as well, if not better, than private-sector forecasts in terms of meansquared error. Internal studies at the Federal Reserve Board have also found that the Board's internal Greenbook" forecasts of real GNP GDP and in ation are unbiased and e cient Reifschneider 199?. This is further supported by Romer and Romer 2000, who nd that not only are the Federal Reserve Board's forecasts of output and in ation unbiased and e cient, they completely dominate private sector forecasts, in the sense that the private sector forecast should bethrown out entirely if the Board's forecasts were to bemade public.
These results might at rst seem to contradict Rudebusch's 1999a nding of a signi cant, irrational noise" component in the real-time in ation data as measured by either the GNP GDP de ator or xed-weight price index. However, as in Orphanides 1998 , 1999 s nal" data is from the perspective of the late 1990's, and thus includes de nitional revisions to GNP and changes in base year. In contrast, all of the papers cited above take particular care to evaluate the performance of the forecasts with respect to a nal measure of the statistic on a de nitionally consistent basis. As McNees 1995 points out, It does not seem reasonable to hold economic forecasters responsible for anticipating such c hanges in the social accounting framework" p. 15. Thus, it is possible that much of the noise" that is found by Rudebusch 1999a is related to de nitional changes in the data rather than deviations from rationality i n the forecasts.
The case for biased real-time data is thus somewhat uncompelling from an empirical as well as a theoretical standpoint. This implies that models incorporating only real-time data uncertainty should be certainty-equivalent. However, framing policymakers' inference problem about the state of the economy as one of signal extraction more generally, as is done in this paper, is still quite plausible. The interpretation of policymakers' estimation process in this case is one of an unobserved, possibly complicated state of the economy that must beinferred using possibly a large numberof observable economic indicators. For example, Chairman Greenspan is notorious for looking at a wide variety of economic statistics in an attempt to infer the current state of the economy and its future course. When policymakers face a signal extraction problem of this kind, as in model 6 above and the general framework below, a strong case for policymaker caution in the face of uncertainty can still bemade.
Coe cient Attenuation, Simple Rules, and Robust Control
The implications of this paper contrast in an interesting way with those from the literature on simple rules" and robust control." In particular, the signal extraction framework of this paper implies that an increase in uncertainty surrounding a given indicator should bemet with an attenuation in policymakers' response coe cient to that variable. At the same time, policymakers' response coe cients to other economic indicators, about which uncertainty hasn't changed, should beincreased in magnitude. 16 The literature on simple rules," in contrast, generally nds that policymakers should attenuate their response coe cients on all variables in policymakers' reaction function, even if the increase in uncertainty surrounds only a single variable. 17 This literature, typi ed by Smets 1998, considers optimal policy within a class of rules that react only to a limited subset of state variables of the model. These simple rules, because they are not the global optimum of policymakers' linear-quadratic problem, will not in general possess the certainty-equivalence property. Thus, observation error on a variable, even of the type in 6 y and 6 z , will typically lead to non-certainty-equivalent behavior with respect to these constrained-optimal rules. For example, Smets 1998 restricts policymakers to rules involving only one lag of output, the four-quarter average in ation rate, and one lag of the interest rate as arguments, and nds that the optimal coe cients on all of these variables are attenuated by an increase in uncertainty surrounding the output gap. Orphanides et al. 1999 , investigating a similarly-constrained class of rules within the Federal Reserve Board's FRB US model, also nd that attenuating the coe cients on all variables in the rule is the best response to increased uncertainty surrounding the output gap. 18 The reason that these ndings di er from those of the present paper can beexplained as follows. The optimal rule in all of these models is a function of multiple lags of the output gap, in ation, and interest rates and many other variables in the FRB US model. To the extent that these variables are omitted, those that enter the simple rule serve partially as proxies for the variables that have been excluded. If the four-quarter average in ation rate enters negatively into an estimation equation for some of these other terms such as past values of the interest rate, then the desired ampli cation in coe cients on current and past in ation that I nd will be o set by the desired ampli cation in the coe cients on these additional lagged output, in ation, and interest rate terms, making the overall e ect on the in ation coe cient ambiguous. 19 Finally, the robust control" literature arrives at just the opposite prescription: policymakers ought to respond more aggressively to every variable in their reaction function when faced with model uncertainty. This literature, typi ed by Onatski and Stock 1998, chooses coe cients on a policy rule to minimize the maximum loss over all possible values for a given parameter within a given range; thus, the policymaker is guaranteed not to make mistakes that are extremely costly. This approach is clearly very di erent from the typical maximization of expected value approach I have taken here, so it is not surprising that the results di er. Intuitively, their ndings are driven by the fact that a bad draw on the e ectiveness of the policy tool a multiplicative parameter can result in very large losses if the rule's responsiveness is not su ciently great. However, it is not clear that an increase in additive uncertainty about potential output would lead to the same conclusions.
Signal Extraction in the General LQG Framework
In this section, I solve the policymakers' signal extraction and optimization problem for the general linear-quadratic-Gaussian framework, and provide the relevant proofs.
As before, I denote the underlying state of the economy b y X t , which m a y n o w b e a vector. X t evolves according to a linear function of one lag of itself and a v ector of policy instruments r t . Thus, X t = AX t,1 + Br t + " t 11 where A and B are known matrices of the approrpriate dimensions. Any constants can be incorporated by de ning one component of X t to be a vector of ones. I denote the observable variables of the system by Z t . These may bea subset of the variables in X t , noisy realizations of a linear function of variables in X t , or some combination of the two.
Thus,
where C is a known matrix of appropriate dimension, with every observable relationship among the elements of X t corresponding to a row in 12. The noise vector t may have some components that are always zero, corresponding to elements of X t that are actually observed. Other components of X t , that are not directly observed, must beinferred from observations of Z t . 20 Note that 12 has been set up as a signal extraction problem rather than one of imperfect observation in which case X t would be a function of the observable variables Z t plus disturbance terms. The latter would exhibit certainty equivalence; the former does not with respect to the observable variables.
The stochastic disturbances " t and t are assumed to be independent of each other, over time, of current and past values of r, X, and Z, and are multivariate normally distributed with constant v ariance-covariance matrices " and , respectively. 21 In practice, these assumptions are not as restrictive as it might seem, because serial correlation and cross-correlation of t and " t can be introduced by including lags of these variables as elements of X t , and rede ning the disturbances in 11 and 12 to beorthogonal innovations to these processes. 22 Correlation between t and X t can beintroduced in a similar fashion.
Policymakers minimize a quadratic loss function:
20 It should be noted that equations in 12 that are redundant, or are not informative about X t , i n t h e sense that policymakers' prior variances on the corresponding elements of Z t are zero, should be dropped from 12. Intuitively, realizations of these components of Z t contain no new information, and thus are irrelevant for updating policymakers' beliefs about X t . Mathematically, this ensures that the matrix C t,1jt,1 C 0 + is nonsingular in the updating equations below. 21 No di culties arise when one allows " and to vary over time, so long as this variation is independent of the policy instrument. 22 Aoki 1967, for example, makes this observation pp. 38 39.
where D is a positive semide nite matrix. Note that this speci cation does not preclude policymakers' preferences from depending on observables Z, since X can beexpanded to include elements of Z as needed. Past values of r can also be incorporated into X and Z. Policymakers choose a value for the vector of instruments r t at the beginning of each period t, conditional on all information available through the end of period t , 1. After r t is chosen, the shocks " t and t are realized, and the value of the vector Z t is observed. Policymakers' information set at the beginning of period t is thus: I t f A; B; C; D; ; " ; ; E 0 X 0 ; Var 0 X 0 ; Z s j s t g 14 where E 0 X 0 and Var 0 X 0 denote the mean and variance of policymakers' prior time 0 distribution on X 0 , which is assumed to be normal.
Policymakers update beliefs about X t via Kalman ltering, which is the optimal inference procedure given the assumptions of normality a b o ve. Letting sjt denote Var t X s , the variance of X s conditional on information available at the beginning of period t, we have the recursive equations: E t,1 X t,1 = A E t,1 X t,2 + Br t,1 15a E t,1 Z t,1 = C E t,1 X t,1 15b E t X t,1 = E t,1 X t,1 + t,1jt,1 C 0 , C t,1jt,1 C 0 + ,1 , Z t,1 , E t,1 Z t,1 15c t,1jt,1 = A t,2jt,1 A 0 + " 16a t,1jt = t,1jt,1 , t,1jt,1 C 0 , C t,1jt,1 C 0 + ,1 C t,1jt,1 16b
Note that the variance tjt evolves deterministically over time, as is typical in the LQG framework. In particular, the variances of policymakers' future estimates are una ected by their choice of the current instrument r t . 23 This leads to separability b e t ween the estimation and control stages of policymakers' problem, and hence to the certainty equivalence result of the following proposition.
23 The policymaker's choice of r t does not a ect the signal extraction aspects of the problem|neither the variance of s nor the variance of X s for any s t|because it is assumed that the coe cient matrices A and C are known with certainty. This is in marked contrast to the experimentation" motive that is present i n Wieland 1998, where policymakers' choice of r t helps to resolve the Brainard uncertainty about the multiplicative parameters of the model. Equation 18 is certainty-equivalent with respect to the state variable X t,1 . However, as should be clear from the previous section, certainty equivalence generally will not hold with respect to the observable variables Z t,1 . The following proposition demonstrates this fact by proving the coe cient attenuation result from the previous section for the general LQG framework. Note that by holding t,1jt,1 xed in what follows, the model is consistent with the interpretation that a structural break in the degree of uncertainty surrounding the indicator variables has occurred in the previous period.
Proposition 2: Suppose that the variance of the rst component of t,1 in 12 is increased, in the sense that element 1; 1 of is increased while all other elements of , and all elements of t,1jt,1 in 15 and 16, are held xed. Then policymakers' optimal response to observables, obtained by substituting 15 into 17, exhibits an attenuation in the response of all elements of policymakers' instrument r t to the rst component o f Z t,1 .
Proof: Recall that r t is a vector of instruments, hence the proposition states that the optimal setting of each of these is attenuated with respect to the rst component o f Z t,1 . This is intuitive because the ordering of the elements of r t is arbitrary.
Let M denote the positive de nite matrix C t,1jt These are exactly the coe cients in question, completing the proof.
One would like to be able to increase the covariances among the various components of t as well, but unfortunately, completely general statements in this case cannot be made.
However, I may be able to say something when the variances are starting from steady state.
Signal Extraction Dynamics in the Basic Model
The analysis of the preceding sections has been essentially static in nature, in that a structural break in uncertainty was known to have occurred in the previous period. It is not clear, then, that the results still apply if the increase in uncertainty occurs several periods earlier, particularly when we take i n to account the fact that increased uncertainty about potential output feeds through to increased uncertainty about subsequent estimates of X, the unobserved state of the economy. Moreover, errors in policymakers' estimates of potential output and X are serially correlated, as policymakers learn about mistakes in their estimates only slowly over time. A proper treatment of the basic model in section 2 would take these dynamic aspects of policymakers' uncertainty into consideration. Thus, the model here will be essentially the same as in section 2. Policymakers' preferences are assumed to beof the form: where X t denotes the unobserved state of the economy, r t the deviation of the real interest rate from its natural" value, and e t agents' expectation of in ation, as before.
Unlike the earlier model, I allow the error term to bepersistent:
where is interpreted as the degree of persistence of shocks to potential output. 24 The normally distributed disturbances " t , t , and t are assumed to be orthogonal to each other, across time, and to all other variables in the system. Need to show that the overall coe cient on the output gap is positive, or could assume it.
Thus, this nding from section 2 is also robust, no matter when the structural break in uncertainty occurred. . Coe cients on lags of in ation and unemployment, obtained by cascading the expectational term backward in 25, may thus also go either way, depending on the sign of the derivative above. For example, if , ' 2 ' 2 = 2 , then the coe cient on E X increases for every s. It then follows that the coe cient on the lagged in ation surprise , e also increases for every s although the change in coe cient on lags of the output gap, y , is not clear for t,2 s. If ,' 2 ' 2 = 2 , then the coe cient o n E X decreases for every s, the coe cient o n y also decreases for every s, and the change in coe cient o n , e now becomes analytically unclear for t , 2 s. For the solution under rational expectations, it is easiest to think of replacing A3 with t = e t + X t + t A3 0 and consider the limit as tends to one. Under both discretion and commitment, the dynamics of the problem in this case are trivial, because it has essentially no persistence policymakers can set X t up to a stochastic disturbance term, and t is a jump variable. Policymakers' problem in period t thus reduces to minimizing the period-t loss function E t y t , y 2 + t , 2 .
When policymakers are short-sighted discretionary", taking e t as xed, it is easy to show that optimization and rational expectations lead to: E t t = 2 2 + 1 , ; E t y t , y = 1 , 2 + 1 , A7 which converge to and 0, respectively, a s ! 1.
Alternatively, when policymakers are far-sighted committed", optimization and rational expectations lead to: E t t = 2 2 + 1 , 2 ; E t y t , y = 1 , 2 + 1 , 2 A8 which likewise converge to and 0 as ! 1 not surprising, since setting t = and y t , y = 0 in expectation is the global optimum, and this was achieved even under discretion.
Thus, under rational expectations, we can regard policymakers as solving the following more standard linear-quadratic problem:
X t = 'X t,1 , r t , r + " t A9 y t , y = X t + t Need to redo whole section using slightly more general model of section 4.
